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Abstract 
The plural character of policing provision in most countries is now widely acknowledged, though 
rarely reflected in the practical police reform programming undertaken by donors. While much of the 
literature on international police assistance focuses on its modest results and innate limitations, less 
attention has been paid to those, still relatively rare, programmes that have sought to engage with 
the local realities of plural policing. This is particularly so in the conflict-affected and fragile settings 
where such assistance is typically provided. In this article, we present three case studies of policing 
innovation and experimentation from Timor-Leste, Solomon Islands and Bougainville respectively, set 
in the context of the recent and very different post-conflict interventions in each place. While not 
wishing to overstate the impact of these modest programs, we highlight their potential contribution 
to fostering productive relations across the multiple social orders and sources of authority found in 
many post-colonial, post-conflict and otherwise fragile contexts. We tentatively conclude that the 
most significant contribution of these kinds of initiative is likely to lie beyond the realm of 
institutionalised policing and, specifically, in relation to larger processes of social and political change, 
including state formation, underway in these places.  
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Introduction 
Although plural policing is now widely recognized as the norm in most developing 
(and developed) countries this is rarely reflected in practical security and justice 
programming. 1  In Timor-Leste, Solomon Islands and Bougainville a wide range of 
actors provide ‘policing’ services. However, donor support remains almost wholly 
focused on the state police, despite the fact that they are seldom the first port of call 
for citizens seeking help. Overall, the results of years of international assistance have 
been underwhelming in terms of improving police performance, addressing the 
causes of insecurity or expanding the reach of police organisations to rural regions. 
These disappointing outcomes have been well documented in both policy and 
academic literatures in each of these places, as they have in many other parts of the 
world.2 
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1 Trevor Jones and Tim Newburn, ‘Understanding plural policing’, T. Jones and T. Newburn (eds), 
Plural Policing: A comparative perspective (Milton Park: Routledge, 2006), pp. 1-11. 
2 Timothy Donais, ‘Back to square one: the politics of police reform in Haiti’, Civil Wars, 7(3), (2005), 
pp. 270-287; Graham Ellison and Nathan W. Pino, Globalization, Police Reform and Development – 
Doing it the Western Way? (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012).  
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The literature has focused more on cataloguing failures than uncovering attempts to 
do things differently. Against a background of growing interest in innovation and 
hybridity in international policy discourse,3 this article introduces three relatively 
rare instances of experimentation in plural policing practice in Australia and New 
Zealand’s near neighbourhood. These cases, all styled as ‘community policing’, 
involve setting up community-police councils in Timor-Leste, supporting a 
Community Officer (CO) pilot scheme in rural Solomon Islands and the Community 
Auxiliary Police (CAP) project in Bougainville that, in part, inspired it. The empirical 
material draws on evaluations and related research that both authors have been 
involved in.4  
 
We begin by reviewing some of the challenges of policing in so-called fragile and 
conflict-affected countries that have become a significant focus of international 
policy in recent years. We then look more specifically at the contexts of the three 
cases, identifying commonalities as well as the distinct social, historical and political 
endowments of each place. The bulk of the article is taken up with an analysis of 
each case study. Our conclusion sums up the findings and draws out the relevant 
policy implications.  
 
Security Governance in Fragile and Conflict-Affected Settings 
 
There is now widespread recognition that policing is not, and never has been, the 
exclusive domain of uniformed police. Rather, it is provided by a range of actors, 
including state police, private security and an extensive constellation of community-
based providers. This makes for a plural policing environment where security and 
order are, in effect, ‘co-produced’ by diverse and often fluid configurations of actors 
and everyday practices that vary considerably across space and time.  
 
Acknowledgement of the plural realities in security provision in places like Timor-
Leste, Solomon Islands and Bougainville has generated an assorted and sometimes 
confusing lexicon of phrases, which are often used interchangeably. These tend to be 
3 World Bank, World Development Report 2011 – Conflict, Security and Development (Washington DC: 
World Bank 2011); Robin Luckham and Tom Kirk, Security in Hybrid Political Contexts: An End-User 
Approach (London: The Justice and Security Research Programme, London School of Economics, 
October 2012).  
4 Gordon Peake, Bu Wilson, and Joao Almeida Fernandes, 2014 HAKOHAK (Hametin Kooperasaun 
entre Kommunidade) and TLCPP (Timor-Leste Community Policing Programme) Mid-term Evaluation; 
Gordon Peake & Sinclair Dinnen Bougainville Community Policing Programme: Independent 
Evaluation (New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, February 2013); Sinclair Dinnen and 
Nicole Haley 2012 Evaluation of Community Officer Scheme in Solomon Islands (Washington DC: 
World Bank, Justice for the Poor Research Report, May 2012); Matthew Allen, Sinclair Dinnen, Daniel 
Evans, and Rebecca Monson, Justice Delivered Locally: Systems, Challenges, and Innovations in 
Solomon Islands, (Washington DC: World Bank, Justice for the Poor Research Report, August 2013).   
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framed in oppositional terms such as ‘state and non-state’, ‘formal and informal’, 
‘modern and traditional’ and, among other things, this serves to obscure the critical 
interactions and relationships between them. Phrases in the academic literature that 
seek to overcome binary framings of the relations between different providers 
include ‘plural policing’, ‘hybrid security’, ‘multi-layered security’ and ‘networked 
security’.5 In the policing literature, the phrase ‘community policing,’ despite its 
origins as a type of institutional policing and its innate elasticity as a concept, is being 
increasingly used in a broader sense to capture the co-production of security and 
order by the uniformed police in conjunction with other community-based actors. 6 
 
Acquiring more nuanced and sophisticated understandings of security in these 
complex environments is a welcome development but does not make it any easier to 
formulate practical programming that can produce outcomes within the many 
imperatives and constraints of donor engagement. This is for a number of reasons. 
Firstly, there remains a tenacious allegiance to an idealised Weberian conception of 
statehood premised on its monopoly of force. This is particularly prevalent within 
the community of practitioners, many of whom are either serving or former officers 
in metropolitan police organisations. Secondly, these individuals also tend to think 
and operate as technicians involved in a one-way process of institutional transfer. 
Living together in compounds and at considerable social distance from local 
populations, they often have only a superficial understanding of the environment 
around them. Related to this is an innate suspicion of irregular security providers, 
who rarely wear uniforms or belong to any recognisable accountability framework. 
Donors continue to ‘see like states’7, focusing on the realm of the formal with its 
familiar bureaucratic and organizational façade. In the administrative capitals of Dili, 
Honiara and Buka the focus has remained on how the state and its machinery ought 
to work rather than how it actually does work.  The progressive blurring of security 
and development agendas over the past two decades has accentuated this 
predilection.8 Such an approach is predisposed to identifying deficiencies in need of 
fixing rather than identifying existing strengths than might be leveraged.  This has 
been recognized at a policy level by both the Australian and New Zealand 
governments but, for the reasons outlined above, has not consistently filtered down 
into programming.9 
 
5 See, for example, Bruce Baker and Eric Scheye, ‘Multi-layered Justice and Security Delivery in Post-
conflict and Fragile States’, Conflict, Security & Development, Vol. 7, No.4, (2007), pp.503-528; 
Jennifer Wood and Clifford Shearing, Imagining Security (Abingdon: Willan Publishing, 2007).  
6 Ellison and Pino, Globalization, Police Reform and Development – Doing it the Western Way?, p.71. 
7 James C. Scott, Seeing Like a State – how certain schemes to improve the human condition have 
failed (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998). 
8 Mark Duffield, Development, Security and Unending War. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2007). 
9 AusAID, Building on Local Strengths: Evaluation of Australian Law and Justice Assistance (Canberra: 
AusAID, Office of Development Effectiveness, December 2012). 
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Cumulatively, these factors help explain why the default position continues to be 
that which has now been critiqued so extensively, namely a focus on perceived 
deficiencies in recipient police institutions. There remains a misalignment between 
the solutions suggested by the analysis and the current repertoire of responses 
available to donors, which are predicated upon notions of linear institutional 
development and the universalism of institutional forms. Police-building work is 
typically conducted by specially trained cadres of serving police (the dominant model 
in Australia and New Zealand) or by contracted expertise managed by large 
consulting companies. The focus is on addressing perceived deficits in organizational 
capacity rather than one derived from a context-specific understanding of how 
governance and security actually work in the society concerned. This ‘deficit’ 
approach draws attention away from local strengths that might be mobilised in 
forging locally relevant solutions to problems of insecurity.10 Few incentives exist for 
innovation and experimentation, while there are many for continuing with business 
as usual. It is against this background that our case studies are set.  
 
Contexts of Interventions 
 
As Bruce Baker has noted frequently in African contexts,  security provision ‘beyond 
the tarmac road’ looks very different, as indeed it often does within many capital 
cities. 11 This observation applies equally to our three case studies, Timor-Leste, 
Solomon Islands and Bougainville. Available research amply demonstrates the 
plurality of security provision in each place. State police and justice agencies do not 
have a monopoly but operate alongside and within wider assemblages12 of other 
individuals, groups and security practices.  
 
While there are significant differences between each context, there are also 
important similarities that make them broadly comparable. Each carries legacies 
from earlier periods of colonial domination that continue to manifest themselves in 
the post-colonial present. For example, each place has experienced different policing 
traditions which reverberate in practice and in memory. Portuguese and Indonesian 
traditions continue to shape the practice of the Timorese police. Nostalgia for a form 
of policing embedded in indirect rule under the British continues to infuse 
imaginings of how a police should operate in Solomon Islands; while negative 
10 Monique Marks, Jennifer Wood, Julian Azzopardi and Thokozani Xaba, ‘Reconfiguring state and 
non-state actors in the provision of safety in (South) Africa: implications for bottom-up policing 
arrangements and for donor funding’, Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law, 63, (2011), pp. 
49-72. 
11 Bruce Baker, ‘Beyond the Tarmac Road: Local Forms of Policing in Sierra Leone and Rwanda’, 
Review of African Political Economy, vol. 35, no. 118 (2008), pp. 555-570. 
12 Rita Abrahamsen and Michael C. Williams, ‘Security Beyond the State: Global Security Assemblages 
in International Politics’, International Political Sociology, no. 3, (2009), pp.1-17. 
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recollections of the Royal Papua New Guinea Constabulary (RPNGC) influence local 
discussions about the future of policing on post-conflict Bougainville.  
 
In these small, poor and predominantly rural territories, the resources and reach of 
the state are severely constrained. While the beneficiaries of substantial windfall 
revenues from resource development, both Timor-Leste and Papua New Guinea 
have circumscribed fiscal and administrative capacities. In each place state authority 
co-exists alongside and interacts with myriad forms of local social organisation. 
Hybridity characterizes contemporary social and political order, and in all three cases 
custom, church and state overlap and intermingle as sources of authority and 
everyday regulation.  
 
Two of these relatively peripheral contexts have experienced major international 
interventions, one in Timor-Leste under the auspices of the United Nations (UN), and 
the other in Solomon Islands through a regional intervention. Policing was a major 
component of both interventions, in terms of initial peace and stabilization 
operations and in the elaborate statebuilding efforts that followed. The Timor-Leste 
and Solomon lslands cases conform to the larger global trend of liberal peace 
building. Both had a strong emphasis on (re-)building state institutions, including 
security and justice systems.  
 
For small police services, these interventions have generated a relatively abundant 
literature, particularly in Timor-Leste where there has been one article published for 
every 100 Timorese police officers.13 This literature has highlighted the deficiencies 
of prevailing international approaches, contributing to a by now familiar critique. 
Harder to discern are stories of innovation, experimentation and positive change. 
We have already rehearsed some of the reasons why this might be so. Perhaps 
another is the dominant research perspective that privileges the organizational and 
political centre, and national level outcomes. Such a focus is relatively blind to local 
complexities, including activities going on in the periphery. Rendering that 
complexity visible requires different analytical tools and a historically informed 
approach.   
 
In each of the cases we write about here, local experts with this knowledge, 
familiarity and nuance have played a significant role in shaping their design. These 
small and modest projects, in many ways peripheral to the main game of the 
intervention, are also characterized by a degree of experimentation and adaptation 
that is noticeably absent from accounts of the larger-scale engagements.  Although 
13 Gordon Peake, ‘Echoes of Portugal, Accents of Indonesia’,  in Conor O’Reilly (ed.), Colonial Policing 
and the Transnational Legacy: The Global Dynamics of Policing Across the Lusophone Community 
(London: Ashgate, 2015).  
 5 
                                                        
each one has its own particularities, they all share a wider conceptualisation of 
policing, going beyond a discrete organizational form, function and ethos. This 
involves deeper and broader interaction, with policing embedded and linked with 
other systems of governance, administration and service delivery. Each case involves 
positioning policing with a larger system of government and representation, with the 
police, in effect, serving as forward agents of the state in highly contested processes 
of state formation. Inevitably there are tensions, especially within donor and policing 
organisations, between this broader conceptualisation and more conventional views 
of policing. Progress made within this space is often the consequence of committed 
individual champions within donors and local police rather than reflecting the 
priorities of the larger programmes they are part of.  
 
 
Timor-Leste 
Since 1999, when a United Nations transitional administration was established in the 
wake of the East Timorese vote for independence from Indonesia, the Timor-Leste 
case has been a mainstay in research and policy debates on police development in 
fragile and conflict-affected states. The template for reform endeavours has been 
liberal peacebuilding, with a focus on building state institutions. Over ten thousand 
UN Police passed through Timor-Leste from 1999 until their eventual departure in 
2012, trying to build up a national police, Polisia Nasional Timor-Leste (PNTL) that 
conformed to a Western model. A wide range of bilateral donors have also been 
involved. Australia has had a sizable programme since 2004 and New Zealand since 
2009; aside from these countries a plenitude of other sources has funded trainings, 
study visits and symposia. It has been a truly global effort, ranging from courses at 
the FBI academy at Quantico to study visits of community policing in Bangladesh and 
almost everywhere in between. 
 
Scholarship on police development in Timor-Leste has focussed on dissecting the 
efforts of the United Nations and bilateral donors, 14 with a consensus that there is 
very little to show for it all. One scholar characterized the approach adopted as one 
of  ‘smoke and mirrors’, ‘smoke’ referring to a focus more on form than substance 
and the ‘mirrors’ connoting the observed phenomena of international police builders 
wishing to develop a police force ‘in their own image’.15   
 
14 Ludovic Hood, ‘Missed Opportunities: The United Nations, Police Service and Defence Force 
Development in Timor-Leste, 1999-2004’, Civil Wars, Vol. 8, No. 2, (2006), pp.142-162; Bu V.E. Wilson, 
‘To 2012 and Beyond: International Assistance to Police and Security Sector Development in Timor-
Leste’ Asian Politics & Policy, Vol. 4, Issue 1, (January 2012), pp.73-88. 
15 Bu V. E. Wilson, Smoke and Mirrors: The Development of the East Timorese police 1999-2009 (Ph.D. 
thesis,  Australian National University, 2010).  
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The focus on building liberal-democratic state institutions has been characterised as 
akin to ‘historical amnesia’ as it disregarded the implications of both the country’s  
legacies  -including the 24 year Indonesian occupation – and the realities of order 
maintenance in a still predominantly rural society. 16  Police development 
programmes paid less attention to alternate and localised sources of authority, 
which appear to have more substance and salience than offices of the metropolitan 
state in Dili. Nearly ten years since the beginning of one of the most extensive state-
building operations in the world, a 2008 survey found that only 12% of the public 
had come into contact with the Timorese police. 17  Security continues to be 
provided by an assortment of diverse security providers, not just the police. They 
include the leadership of Timor-Leste’s 442 village councils or sukus, and leaders 
who derive their authority from a combination of customary sources. As in 
Bougainville, another significant source of authority is derived from resistance to 
occupation. Groups known as seguransa voluntario, seguransa popular are often 
comprised of former resistance fighters whereas other groups such as kablehan have 
origins in customary practices. Reflecting the diversity of Timor-Leste, groups 
operate in different ways from district to district and, oft-times, suku to suku. 
According to a follow-up survey in 2013, people ranked citizens (51%) and 
community leaders (21%) higher than PNTL when asked who was primarily 
responsible for maintaining security within their locality.18 The PNTL are a part of this 
security network, regularly using a range of different providers to extend their reach 
 
Few programmes have tried explicitly to engage with the plural realities of order 
maintenance in Timor-Leste. Commencing at the tail end of the large international 
presence in Timor-Leste, the Asia Foundation (TAF) programme is notable for trying 
to engage with this complexity. 19 Another innovation is that the programme is 
implemented largely by national staff rather than expatriate advisers. 
 
Like the other case studies, the small TAF project is broadly framed using an elastic 
definition of community policing, a phrase in regular circulation in Timor-Leste. 20 
 In implementation terms, the TAF project has entailed working ‘bottom up’ with 
communities and, simultaneously, ‘top down’ with the police institution. Activities 
include the establishment of community policing councils (Konsellu Polisiamentu 
16 Maj Nygaard-Christensen, ‘Building from Scratch: Aesthetics of Post-Disaster Reconstruction’, 
Anthropology Today, Vol. 27, No. 6, (December 2011), pp. 8-10. 
17 The Asia Foundation (2008) Law and Justice in Timor-Leste: A Survey of Citizen Awareness and 
Attitudes Regarding Law and Justice 2008. 
18 The Asia Foundation (2013) Timor-Leste Law and Justice Survey 2013. 
19 The project is funded jointly by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) 
and the New Zealand Aid Programme.  
20 As a term, community policing has evolved over a period of several years, from a marginal position 
to one increasingly central to the organisation's identity. This has occurred due to a confluence of 
donor programming and advocacy, existing customary practices and support within the PNTL.  
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Komunitária-KPK) and training to the lower tiers of the PNTL, a cadre that is 
frequently neglected by international police development programmes.  
 
The most visible part of the programme is the KPK, which cover about a quarter of 
the country’s sukus. In many respects, this is not a particularly new idea. Forums for 
police and community to work together are staple features in many development 
interventions in societies with frayed or non-existent relationships between police 
and community and their value is the subject of continued lively debate here as 
elsewhere.21 What is innovative about this version is that the concept of a police 
community council has been adapted in a manner that aligns with the cadences and 
cultures of Timor-Leste, with its focus on consensus and group decision-making. 
Headed by the suku chief, the forums include representatives from the suku police, 
youth representatives, and veterans. The KPK’s ‘hear and resolve a variety of public 
safety concerns…such as fights, land disputes, theft and even domestic violence.’22 
The program has collected data which points to the KPK being used as a vehicle for 
dispute resolution. 
 
Although relatively early days, the KPK’s appear popular and fulfill a community 
need. Focus-group participants were extremely positive about having a forum for 
discussing issues of common concern. Many credited the councils as playing an 
important role in reducing community conflicts (by simply being there as a forum) 
although these claims appeared impressionistic and hard to verify. The councils also 
appear welcomed by the police, who view them as a way of sharing security 
provision. A police commander in the district of Baucau said: 
 
It gives power and authority to the community to resolve the situation. And it 
makes them feel important. Many of the issues can be resolved according to 
tara bandu (customary law).23 
 
The programme is working within the context of wider processes of administrative 
devolution in Timor-Leste. One particular unit of governance that is receiving a lot of 
attention is the suku, and forward deployment of state police is an important part of 
this overall move towards decentralisation. The strategy includes the establishment 
of 442 suku police officers (Ofisial Polisu Suku - OPS) and is premised on the need for 
the PNTL to get closer to the people they serve. It is a popular initiative, supported 
21 Bruce Baker, ‘Community Policing in Freetown, Sierra Leone: Foreign Import or Local Solution?’, 
Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding, Vol 2, Issue 1, (2008), pp.23-42 
22 Todd Wassel ‘Institutionalising Community Policing in Timor-Leste’ London: Overseas Development 
Institute (2014) p.20. According to Timor-Leste’s Law on Domestic Violence, it is only the official 
judicial sector that should have responsibility for resolving cases of sexual assault.  
23 Interview, Baucau, Timor-Leste August 2014 
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by 97% of respondents in the 2013 TAF survey.24 Analogous to the CAP and CO to be 
discussed subsequently, these officers are conceived as the ‘front line’ of police 
interaction with the community. The TAF is among the organisations providing 
training support for OPS officers. 
 
While the KPKs are the most visible features of the programme, there is engagement 
in a range of other activities, which perhaps are not as well heralded. The 
programme has supported the establishment of the Komisaun Diretiva Distrital 
(KDD), a forum to discuss pertinent issues at a district level.25 It is also supporting 
community outreach through television and radio and supporting training as well as 
other initiatives, with a focus on the lower ranks of the PNTL, a large sub-section that 
police development initiatives have traditionally neglected. 
 
Engaged, empowered and networked Timorese staff play an important part in 
ensuring that the programmes ‘fit’ with prevailing realities and are not considered an 
outside imposition.  Unlike most police development engagements, which are 
dominated by expatriates, all but one of the staff on the HAKOHAK initiative are 
Timorese. Through networks, contacts and a shared language the staff are able to 
gain easy access to government officials and police. This ‘Timor-first’ model 
contributes substantially to local ownership, engagement and, potentially, 
sustainability as well as being a much cheaper delivery model.   
 
 An important part of the programme is the development and testing of hypothesis 
through evidence-based research. It has commissioned analytical pieces, managed a 
police-community survey and developed in-house contributions. The result is a 
substantial body of work that constitutes a valuable resource for researchers and a 
repository of practical information for donors engaging in this sector.    
 
Solomon Islands 
 
The small archipelagic nation of Solomon Islands was from mid-2003 the subject of a 
decade-long peacebuilding and statebuilding intervention with a strong accent on 
policing. The Australian-led Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands (RAMSI) 
followed a low-level conflict, known locally as the “ethnic tension”. 26 Government 
authority had broken down, with serious lawlessness in some areas and looming 
national bankruptcy.  The Royal Solomon Islands Police Force (RSIPF) fractured along 
ethnic lines and effectively collapsed. Australian policymakers viewed these 
24 The Asia Foundation (2013) Timor-Leste Law and Justice Survey 2013 
25 The evaluation found  that that the PNTL are self-funding two of the KPKs in Ainaro district.  
26 Jon Fraenkel, The Manipulation of Custom: from Uprising to Intervention in the Solomon Islands 
(Wellington: Victoria University Press, 2004).  
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developments primarily through the global lens of state failure and the threat this 
posed to Australian and regional security.27  
 
Conforming broadly to liberal peace interventions elsewhere, RAMSI was also unique 
in being a police-led mission. Its mandate was to restore security, repair the 
machinery of government, improve economic governance, and build strong and 
peaceful communities. At its height, it comprised around 330 frontline police (known 
as the Participating Police Force – PPF) from Australia, New Zealand and other Pacific 
Islands states, supported by 1,800 military personnel. Civilian advisers were placed 
across a range of central government agencies. The PPF initially provided executive 
policing before assuming a predominantly advisory role with the RSIPF aimed at 
building “a high quality, professional and credible policing service”.28 This work 
entailed a familiar repertoire of training and mentoring programmes; physical 
infrastructure and equipment; managerial systems and accountability mechanisms.  
 
RAMSI entered its transition phase in 2011, with the graduated drawdown of 
international personnel and resources.29 Development activities were absorbed into 
regular donor-managed aid programmes and, since 2013, RAMSI’s remaining 
presence has been a slimmed-down PPF advising the RSIPF. While there have been 
considerable achievements, the need for continuing PPF support indicates the slow 
and non-linear character of police-building. Solomon Islanders continue to lack 
confidence in the RSIPF and demonstrate anxiety about safety and security.30 There 
are also concerns about the sustainability of gains made under RAMSI as external 
assistance diminishes. With most of this support directed at re-building a centralized 
and urban-oriented model of policing, meeting the security needs of rural citizens 
remains another concern. 
 
With the notable exception of the modest Community Officer project, there have 
been few attempts to engage with the informal approaches to community security 
prevalent in rural Solomon Islands.  Initiated by the RSIPF, with support from the 
PPF, on a pilot basis in late 2009, COs were appointed in 23 rural locations, covering 
every province.  These locally-based officials were lay persons appointed by the 
RSIPF in consultation with chiefs. Their role was to act as liaison between the police 
27 Greg Fry and Tarcisius Kabutaulaka, ‘Political legitimacy and state-building intervention in the 
Pacific’, in G. Fry and T. Kabutaulaka (eds), Intervention and state-building in the Pacific (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2008), pp. 1-36. 
28 RAMSI Annual Performance Report 2007-08 (online). http://www.ramsi.org/wp-
content/uploads/2014/07/Independent-Annual-Performance-Report-2007-08.pdf 
29 Nicholas Coppel, ‘Transition of the Regional Assistance Mission to Solomon Islands’, State, Society 
and Governance in Melanesia Discussion Paper 2012/10, (Canberra: College of Asia and the Pacific, 
ANU, 2013). http://ips.cap.anu.edu.au/ssgm 
30 Sinclair Dinnen and Matthew Allen, ‘Paradoxes of postcolonial police-building: Solomon Islands’, 
Policing & Society 23(2), (2013), pp. 222-242. 
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and local leaders, reporting serious crimes upwards, while working closely with 
community leadership to resolve minor disputes. The pilot was informed by 
recognition of the thin and uneven presence of state police in rural areas, the 
important role performed by local leaders in everyday order maintenance, and the 
need for better linkages between these different sources of authority and 
regulation.  RSIPF and PPF officials behind the pilot were also aware of the old area 
constable, an official who performed a similar role in Solomon Islands recent past 
(see below), as well being familiar with the Community Auxiliary Police in 
neighbouring Bougainville (see section on Bougainville below). An evaluation of the 
short-lived pilot revealed its positive reception among rural communities and the 
RSIPF, and, more significantly, its potential as a mechanism for linking and 
coordinating plural policing and justice provision in rural areas.31  
 
An understanding of Solomon Islands’ contemporary context and recent history is 
critical to considering the significance of this relatively rare policing ‘experiment’. 
The island nation shares the socio-linguistic diversity and geographical fragmentation 
found in the wider Melanesian region, with its population of half a million people 
dispersed over six main islands and across 80 language groups. Around 85% of the 
population lives in rural communities that are based on complex interplays of kinship 
and exchange relations, friendships, church membership and myriad claims to 
customary land. Government resources and personnel remain concentrated in the 
national capital, Honiara, and a number of small provincial towns.  
 
Government was already viewed by many Solomon Islanders as largely absent from 
rural areas well before the outbreak of the tension in 1998.32  This perception of 
‘state withdrawal’ has often been combined with nostalgia for the old British colonial 
system of indirect rule. The latter is viewed as having at least provided some tangible 
government presence in rural localities. As well as vertical links between the distant 
administrative capital and rural periphery, these reminiscences recall horizontal 
linkages between government officials and traditional leaders that enabled a degree 
of coherence between different forms of authority. Remnants of this old system 
were carried over after independence in 1978. These included elected Area Councils, 
which provided the basis of a rudimentary system of local-level government. Local 
courts dealt with a range of minor criminal, civil, and ‘customary’ cases, while ‘area 
constables’ afforded a local police presence, helping to enforce Council by-laws and 
local court decisions.  These officials also served as critical intermediaries between 
traditional leaders, council areas and the wider state justice system.  
31 Dinnen and Haley, Evaluation of the community officer project in Solomon Islands.   
32 Deborah McDougall, ‘Sub-national governance in post-RAMSI Solomon Islands’, State, Society and 
Governance in Melanesia Working Paper 2014/3, (Canberra: College of Asia and the Pacific, ANU, 
2014). 
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Local-level government disappeared with the suspension of Area Councils in 1998, as 
did area constables in most places, while local courts became increasingly moribund 
in the absence of adequate government support, hearing only land cases rather than 
the range of local disputation managed previously. This is the context of local 
narratives of state withdrawal, including the perceived decoupling of state policing 
and justice from local community-based approaches.  RAMSI’s top-down approach, 
with its focus on re-building central agencies in Honiara and relative neglect of rural 
areas, has done little to counter these perceptions.  
 
As in Timor-Leste and Bougainville, most rural citizens continue to rely on 
community-based approaches for everyday dispute resolution and security. The 
prevalence and diversity of these local approaches are documented in recent 
research undertaken on behalf of the Solomon Islands’ Ministry of Justice and Legal 
Affairs.33 This research –Justice Delivered Locally (JDL) – identified three broad and 
overlapping systems of rules in rural areas, distinguished by the different sources of 
authority upon which each is primarily based – namely, state, church and kastom.34 
Rather than being uniform or discrete, these systems exist in diverse and relational 
configurations shaped by continuous interaction.  Each is seen as having core 
spheres of operation. State justice tends to be viewed as the appropriate way of 
dealing with serious crimes and disputes. Kastom is preferred in the case of more 
socially-embedded disputes, such as land matters, whereas church-based 
approaches appear to be preferred in marital and family disputes, especially by 
women.  
 
The JDL research also revealed how these local approaches are coming under 
increasing stress in light of larger processes of globalisation. New forms of 
contestation have emerged that local approaches struggle to manage. Four main 
types of contemporary disputation were identified: social order problems, usually 
associated with substance abuse; development and land-related disputes; disputes 
arising from NGO, donor and government projects; and marital conflict and domestic 
violence. The standing of chiefs and other local leaders was seen as increasingly 
compromised in many areas owing to their involvement in controversial business 
and development schemes.   
 
Despite the growing fragility of local approaches, the JDL work found evidence of 
extensive experimentation as communities seek to adjust and strengthen their 
coping strategies. These generally involve efforts to forge better linkages between 
33 Allen, Dinnen, Evans, and Monson, Justice Delivered Locally. 
34 Local usage of kastom often approximates the English word “custom”, but should not be 
interpreted as referring to a timeless and unchanging pre-European way of life. 
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different approaches and, in particular, between kastom and state justice, while 
retaining a measure of local control. They represent an attempt to reverse the 
decoupling noted above, but in contrast to the centralizing tendencies of 
government and RAMSI, emphasise the need for alignment with existing local 
approaches, rather than their replacement. These local demands express popular 
aspirations for more effective articulation between local and state approaches that 
enhance the capabilities of both, and, more broadly, support for locally driven or 
‘bottom-up’ approaches to security and development. 
 
The positive reception afforded the CO scheme in the rural communities where it 
was trialed needs to be seen within this larger context of social and political change. 
Community support provided another indication of local wishes to re-establish 
connections with the state system that were perceived as having largely disappeared 
in recent decades. One villager told the evaluation team that the CO marked “the 
return of government” while another remarked that “the CO makes us feel that the 
government is now with us”.35 In large part owing to the failure of the RSIPF to 
provide adequate support, the role of the CO evolved organically over the lifetime of 
the scheme, adapting to the diverse configurations of local authority structures and 
priorities in different places. While retaining a quasi-policing orientation in most 
places, the CO operated as an enforcer of chiefly authority in some localities, while 
adopting a more direct dispute resolution role in others and a broader community 
governance role in yet others.  
 
The evaluation found that the mere presence of the CO contributed to community 
perceptions of improved safety. With the RSIPF unable to deliver the anticipated 
support, it was the prospect that law enforcement might eventuate that appeared to 
vest the CO with a particular authority not shared by other local leaders. In this 
regard, the CO was able to evoke ‘the shadow of the law’ if not its substance. 
Another important finding was the catalytic potential of the CO as an agent of 
positive social change. Although broadly supportive of local power relations in most 
places, there was also evidence of individual COs working in subtle and creative ways 
to moderate the exercise of chiefly power and represent the interests of weaker 
groups, notably women and youth. While it is important not to overstate the impact 
of this extremely modest and short-lived scheme, it nevertheless provides a 
tantalising glimpse of local policing innovation with potential to transform existing 
institutions and power relations, rather than simply reinforce them.  
 
 
 
 
35 Dinnen and Haley, p.30. 
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Bougainville 
 
Part of the same island chain as Solomon Islands, Bougainville shares many socio-
cultural and geographic similarities with its southern neighbour. Its population of 
around 300,000 is overwhelmingly rural-based, and highly localised forms of social 
organisation and authority provide the basis for everyday governance and 
regulation. Deep historical grievances have contributed to a strong sense of 
Bougainvillean identity and a tradition of resistance to colonial and other forms of 
domination.36 There was strong local opposition to the construction of the large 
Panguna copper mine in the late 1960s, as well as to Bougainville’s subsequent 
incorporation into the newly independent state of Papua New Guinea in 1975. While 
the establishment of a system of provincial government relieved tensions at the 
time, they resurfaced dramatically in the late 1980s and Bougainville experiencing a 
bloody and protracted conflict from 1989-1997. A local disagreement over benefit 
sharing arrangements at the Panguna mine escalated into a secessionist struggle 
with Papua New Guinea; in part, a result of heavy-handed tactics by the PNG police 
and military. In its later stages, the conflict degenerated into multiple small-scale 
disputes between various local factions.  
 
The peace process that began in 1997 was largely locally-initiated and led. 
International assistance comprised a small United Nations political office and 
unarmed truce, and, later, peace monitors from New Zealand, Australia and 
neighbouring Pacific island states. In contrast to the bigger engagements in Timor-
Leste and Solomon Islands, that in Bougainville has been described as a “light 
intervention”.37 A comprehensive peace agreement was signed in 2001 under which 
Bougainville was granted a unique status as an autonomous region within PNG, as 
well as the prospect of a referendum on its future political status within a 10-15 year 
period. The newly autonomous region adopted its own Constitution and established 
an autonomous government in 2005. Various powers were to be transferred from 
the national level to the autonomous government, including those in relation to 
police, courts and criminal laws.38 
 
Emerging from a devastating decade-long conflict, Bougainville’s leaders were intent 
not only in forging a different political relationship with PNG, but also on re-
configuring state-society relations within Bougainville itself. Bougainville’s 
36 Anthony J. Regan, ‘The Bougainville Conflict: Political and Economic Agendas’ in K. Ballentine and J. 
Sherman (eds.) The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance (Boulder and 
London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003). 
37 Anthony J. Regan, Light Intervention – Lessons from Bougainville (Washington DC: United States 
Institute of Peace Press, 2012). 
38 Bougainville Peace Agreement 2001. 
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foundational documents 39  envisaged a ‘hybrid political order’ 40  that would 
accommodate and build on local strengths, including ‘traditional’ forms of leadership 
and authority. This vision was particularly evident in deliberations around the future 
of policing and justice.41 
 
The preference for hybrid governance manifested early in the peace process with 
the establishment of Council of Elders (CoEs), initially as an instrument of 
reconciliation and now the second tier of government in the autonomous region. 
CoE’s are authorised to maintain security, settle disputes and facilitate 
reconciliation in designated council areas. Forging closer links between (state and 
non-state) actors at different levels of Bougainville society was seen as critical to 
the development of more socially embedded approaches to policing and justice.  
 
Most existing police infrastructure was destroyed during the conflict. In early 1998, 
Bougainville authorities requested international assistance to train community-
based police. This resulted in the Bougainville Community Policing Project (BCPP), 
jointly-funded by Australia and New Zealand before being taken over by the latter. 
An early focus was on the establishment of community-based officers, later known 
as the Community Auxiliary Police, who were to be supervised by the newly named 
Bougainville Police Service (BPS) made up of remaining Bougainvillean members of 
the RPNGC.42 The new name was suggestive of the strong community orientation 
envisaged for the BPS and decisive break from the approach attributed to their 
RPNGC predecessors. As the Bougainville Constitutional Commission stated, “it is 
also clear that people do not want to go back to the kind of situation that existed 
before the conflict, when there was a concentration of large groups of police in the 
urban centres, and little effort to integrate police into communities”.43  
 
Police development in post-conflict Bougainville is now bifurcated between two 
policing models represented by the BPS and CAP respectively. The BPS currently 
consists of approximately 163 sworn officers based mainly in three urban centres 
and sitting under it are around 340 CAP members based in 196 communities across 
rural Bougainville. Although they are part of the same policing organisation and 
beneficiaries of the same international assistance programme (e.g. the BCPP), the 
39 Including the Bougainville Peace Agreement;  Report of the Third and Final Draft of the Bougainville 
Constitution (Bougainville: Bougainville Constitutional Commission, July 2004); and the Constitution of 
the Autonomous Region of Bougainville. 
40 Volker Boege, ‘Vying for legitimacy in post-conflict situations: the Bougainville case’, Peacebuilding, 
2:3, (2014), pp.237-252.  
41 Sinclair Dinnen and Gordon Peake, ‘More Than Just Policing: Police Reform in Post-conflict 
Bougainville’, International Peacekeeping, vol.20, No.5, (November 2013), pp.570-584. 
42 R. A. Shaw, Bougainville Police Restructure Project – Final Report. (Buka: Bougainville Police Service, 
9 July 2010, p.16) 
43 Bougainville Constitutional Commission, p.233. 
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BPS and CAP have followed divergent paths in terms of development, policing styles 
and reception within the broader community. The BPS, which has autonomous 
qualities under the new political dispensation, retains important links to the RPNGC 
and continues to resemble it in terms of organisational form. As noted in one 
report, the BPS “more closely reflects a provincial police command of the Royal 
Papua New Guinea Constabulary (RPNGC) rather than the semi-autonomous body 
that it was planned to become”.44 Many of its older personnel served with the 
RPNGC, and new recruits still go through the RPNGC training college in PNG’s 
national capital, Port Moresby. In addition, the process of transferring powers from 
the national level to the ABG, including those over policing, remains partial and 
incomplete. Many powers are still vested in national authorities, including the 
RPNGC, rendering it difficult for Bougainville to progress its own vision of police 
development. 
 
Donor efforts to re-orient and develop the BPS have relied on international advisers 
on six-month deployments and engaged in various ‘capacity-building’ activities such 
as mentoring, preparing and delivering training modules, and writing procedural 
manuals. The BPS has been described as “a weak institution, suffering poor morale, 
bad discipline and low effectiveness”45, with these characteristics attributed to 
inadequate numbers and resources, as well as deficiencies in leadership, 
management, accountability and professionalism.  Public confidence in the BPS 
remains low, reflecting, in part, antipathy to what many view as the continuation of 
the old RPNGC policing approach. This perception is particularly marked in the 
southern region where the BPS is often referred to disparagingly as the ‘PNG 
police’.46  
 
By contrast, the BCPP’s engagement with the CAP has demonstrated more 
promising results. International advisers have adopted an enabling rather than a 
prescriptive approach and, have attempted to work with the grain of local beliefs 
and practices. Significant time spent time in country has also helped attune key 
programme staff to on-the-ground realities. The BCPP has progressively extended 
the presence of CAP officers in different parts of Bougainville, providing greater 
access to basic policing services than ever before. It has also placed a priority on 
female participation in recruitment courses, leading to a reported increase in 
women recruits from 5% in 2008 to 21% in 2012.47 This provides aggrieved women 
with the opportunity to interact with female CAP officers regarding sensitive issues, 
44  Shaw, Bougainville Police Restructure, p.10. 
45 James McGovern and Monica Taga, Bougainville Community Policing Project: Independent 
Evaluation, 2009, p.10. http://www.aid.govt.nz/about-aid-programmeme/measuring-
results/evaluation/activity-reports/2010-review-and-evaluation-reports/bougainville-com 
46 Dinnen and Peake, ‘More Than just Policing’, p.576. 
47 Dinnen and Peake, Bougainville Community Policing Project, p.17.  
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such as family and sexual violence. This is also a practical example of how one of 
the obvious risks of engaging with ‘traditional’ justice actors can be mitigated. 
Instead of simply reinforcing existing leadership structures and power relations, the 
CAP, like the CO in Solomon Islands, can potentially be mobilised as a catalyst of 
social change.  
 
Whereas the institutional form of the ‘new’ BPS makes few obvious concessions to 
Bougainville’s social and geographical endowments and recent history, the CAP 
aligns more closely with local aspirations for a socially-embedded policing. It 
constitutes a hybrid model, evident in its alignment with community leadership and 
governance structures and the different sources of authority and legitimacy on 
which it is able to draw. Although they are sworn members of the BPS, and bound 
to uphold and enforce state law, CAP officers are nominated by village chiefs and 
their candidacy has to be approved by the local CoE. In this regard, they are 
potentially critical intermediaries between different social orders, with a foot in 
both camps.48 This hybrid quality also means that the CAP is, in theory at any rate, 
subject to different layers of accountability. At the local level this entails that 
exercised by the communities these officers live and work in, including the relevant 
Council of Elders. Accountability is also exercised through the CAP itself, notably by 
the international advisers who appear to act as the final arbiter of individual 
performance and discipline within the CAP.49 Evidence from the recent evaluation 
undertaken by the present authors indicates that a much higher level of 
accountability applies in the CAP than in the BPS, where few of the serious 
allegations made against officers are ever followed up.50 CAP’s important policing 
role is also demonstrated by preliminary research, which indicates that it is the 
source of most of the incidents (around 85%) reported to the BPS.51  
 
While it is important to acknowledge the innovative qualities of the CAP initiative, it 
is also clearly necessary not to exaggerate its potential, particularly given the many 
challenges facing Bougainville as it moves forward. Conflict stresses are re-emerging 
and these are likely to increase in light of population growth, urbanisation and 
rising popular expectations that the weak autonomous government simply cannot 
fulfil. The economic realities of running an autonomous region, let alone an 
independent state, provide the backdrop to current discussions around the 
resumption of mining. This prospect, along with the looming window for holding 
the referendum on Bougainville’s future political status, is already generating high 
48 Sally Engle Merry, ‘Translational Human Rights and Local Activism: Mapping the Middle’, American 
Anthropologist, Vol. 108, No.1, March 2006, pp.38-51. 
49 Dinnen and Peake, ‘More Than just Policing’, p.578. 
50 Dinnen and Peake, Bougainville Community Policing Project, p.18.  
51 Janice A. Lewis, ‘Quality Assurance Project Report: Bougainville Community Policing Project, 
unpublished report, Massey University, 2011. 
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levels of contestation and potential for conflict. The availability of weapons left over 
from the conflict adds to the risks.  An effective security capability to manage this 
situation is clearly needed. The main strength of the CAP, as we have argued 
elsewhere,52 is its potential role in the longer-term process of state formation and 
the contribution it might make to helping build the kind of hybrid political order 
envisaged by Bougainville leaders. 
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In contrast to much of the literature on police development, which tends to focus on 
the failings of international approaches, this article has sought to illuminate 
relatively rare examples of attempts to do this work differently. Our claims in these 
cases are modest and provisional. They do not present definitive solutions to 
complex problems of security and development, nor are they necessarily scalable 
and replicable. In so far as they evince success it is because they are context specific 
rather than being drawn from an international ‘toolkit’.  
 
That said, we believe that these cases of experimentation and innovation are 
significant and merit closer study by scholars and practitioners of conflict and 
fragility than can be gleaned from a one-off evaluation.  These programmes have 
sought to engage directly with the plural realities of these socially complex and 
fragmented environments, characterized by the entanglement of myriad forms of 
order and authority.  Rather than simply trying to transplant familiar institutional 
solutions and hoping for the best, the entry point in each case has been an 
acknowledgement of the messy and entwined reality of plural policing. In this 
respect, the implications of our study go well beyond these three places and have a 
resonance for the fragile and conflicted states that have become such a high priority 
for international interventions in recent times.   
 
In each of our cases, we have shown a disconnection between the administrative 
and political centres and the rural peripheries where the majority of the population 
live. Donor programming nevertheless continues to privilege the centre, thereby 
engaging in partial, limited and, sometimes, counter-productive ways.  The focus on 
state authority to the exclusion of other sources of power and legitimacy that 
continue to prevail in places like Timor-Leste, Bougainville and Solomon Islands 
means that a large part of the realities of everyday security governance are simply 
not  seen.  An important strength of each of the three projects examined is their 
potential for linking along the vertical and horizontal axis that can help break down 
the pronounced urban-rural divide. Similarly, these endeavours can also contribute 
52 Dinnen and Peake, ‘More Than just Policing’. 
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to the fostering of productive relations across the multiple social orders found in 
such places. In contributing to the extension of the functional authority of the state, 
these community policing initiatives can become catalysts for state formation and 
consolidation in environments where limited statehood is increasingly recognized a 
major source of conflict and instability. Perhaps the most significant contribution of 
these modest community policing experiments ultimately lies beyond the realm of 
policing in relation to larger process of political and social change.  
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